The Riyadh agreements put together – models of brevity – represent at least three interesting legal issues. Did the fact that the Riyadh agreements were secret pacts for several years before their existence was made public undermine their validity? Second, to what extent can Egypt rely on or enforce the agreements? Finally, what is the extent of the rights and obligations under the agreements and what responses could the parties take in the event of a breach? But this failure to include treaties in the UN Charter could be a dead letter. Scientists have observed that respect has always been patchy, and the lack of registration of an international agreement has not prevented the ICC from imposing a case of maritime border and Qatar`s island sovereignty against Bahrain. Neither Qatar nor the Quartet addressed this issue in their submissions to the ICJ; Saudi Arabia may have registered the treaties with a plethora of caution since then rather than a sense of necessity. Secret treaties, such as the Riyadh Agreements, not only do not violate international law in practice, but may even be appropriate for reasons of internal and external security. Since then, the implementation of the Riyadh agreement has been thwarted by disagreement over the implementation order, a subject often invoked to justify the dismantling of the proposed kuwait agreement in 2016. The STC insists on the appointment of a governor and a police chief from Aden before transferring its troops out of the city; Hadi insists otherwise. Distrust and bad intentions on both sides have poisoned implementation talks. While both sides comply, they continue to take military measures that believe in their rhetoric. Fighting has continued since November, with the STC degenerating its rhetoric against Hadi and his government, claiming that Hadi is merely a peasant for northern terrorists (a reference to Hadi`s ruling allies, the Yemeni Congregation for Reforms, better known as Islah) and the occupier. Hadi`s side, on the other hand, continued to build its forces and moved units from Marib and Hadramawt to increase pressure on the STC. While the agreement legitimized the status of the STC, which was previously excluded from all UN-negotiated peace negotiations, and ensured the influence of the United Arab Emirates by the STC, it is not certain that such a model will actually work in practice and that the STC will respect it, including Saudi oversight of the agreement. Since the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, the United Arab Emirates has not provided further statements of support for the agreement; nor is there any evidence that the United Arab Emirates is putting pressure on the TCC to comply with its rules.